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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP E. ELLIS and 
CAROLYN B. ELLIS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MRS. BETTY GILBERT, 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained by Carolyn B. Ellis, and by 
Phillip E. Ellis, for the death of his unborn child, 
and damage to his automobile. 
This case is before the Court upon an Inter-
mediate Appeal, the Order granting the Interlocu-
tory Appeal having been entered February 8, 1966. 
The defendant and appellant petitioned for an In-
termediate Appeal from an Order of the District 
Court of Duchesne County, requiring the defendant 
and appellant to answer an Interrogatory submitted 
by the plaintiffs and respondents. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Duchesne County, Joseph 
E. Nelson, Judge, entered an Order requiring the 
defendant and appellant to answer an Interroga-
tory inquiring as to the existence of liability in-
surance, and the name of the defendant's liability 
insurance carrier. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Order 
of the District Court requiring answer to the In-
terrogatory as to the existence of liability insurance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs commenced an action in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
seeking to recover damages against Mrs. Betty Gil-
bert for personal injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff, Carolyn B. Ellis. Phillip E. Ellis, in a separ-
ate cause of action, asks damages because of the 
death of his unborn child, and for damages to the 
automobile which his wife was driving at the time 
of the accident ( R. 2-3) . 
Venue in this action was changed to Duchesne 
County, State of Utah (R. 1). 
Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, served Interrogatories to be answered 
by the defendant. 
Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 18 was as follows: 
"18. Was the defendant insured or does she 
2 
claim to be insured by any policy or 
general liability insurance at the time 
of the alleged casualty. If this interroga-
tory is answered in the affirmative: 
(a) State the name of the company issu-
ing such police and the amount of 
coverage. 
( b) If the defendant claims to be so 
insured and said claim has been 
denied, state in detail the facts 
upon which you rely as a basis for 
said claim." (R. 16) 
The defendant filed a timely objection to the 
Interrogatory, and specifically objected to Inter-
rogatory No. 18 and subdivisions, for the reasons 
that the information sought by said Interrogatory 
was not reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of any admissible evidence, and it was not 
relevant to the subject matter in the pending action, 
and did not relate to the claim or defense of either 
party (R. 18). 
Argument on the Objections to Interrogatories 
was heard by Judge Joseph E. Nelson, and by Order 
dated December 7, 1965, filed December 9, 1965, 
Judge Nelson ordered the defendant to answer In-
terrogatory No. 18 (R. 28). 
The defendant filed a Petition for Intermedi-
ate Appeal ( R. 30), and the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah granted an Interlocutory Appeal, 




THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING 
THE DEFENDANT TO ANSWER THE INTERROGA-
TORY RELATING TO THE NAME OF DEFENDANT'S 
INSURANCE CARRIER AND THE LIMITS OF LIABIL-
ITY. 
The Interrogatories of plaintiffs' to be answer-
ed by the defendant and appellant were served pur-
suant to the provisions of Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The second paragraph 
of Rule 33 provides: 
"Interrogatories may relate to any matters 
which can be inquired into under Rule 26 
(b) ... " 
Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides: 
"(b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION. Unless 
otherwise ordered by the Court, as pro-
vided by Rule 30 ( b) or ( d) , the depon-
ent may be examined regarding any mat-
ter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action, whether it relates to the 
claim or defense of the examining party, 
or to the claim or defense of any other 
party, including the exist.ei:ice, descrip-
tion, nature, custody, cond1t10n and loca-
tion of any books, documents or other 
tangible things, and the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of 
the relevant facts. It is not ground for 
objection that the testimony will be in-
4 
admissible at the trial if the testimcmy 
sought appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence." (Emphasis ours) 
Rule 26(b) specifically sets forth that Inter-
rogatories may be used to obtain information re-
garding any matter, not privileged, (a) which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action, whether it relates to the claim or de-
fense of the examining party; (b) or the claim or 
defense of any party; ( c) including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition and location 
of any books, documents or other tangible things, 
and the identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of the relevant facts. 
The Rule further provides it is not ground 
for objection that testimony will be inadmissible 
at the trial if: 
" ... the testimony sought appears reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence." 
The Rules of Procedure indicate clearly that 
the scope of examination is as set forth in Rule 
26 ( b). In this case, question as to whether the de-
fendant does or does not have liability insurance 
is not relevant to the subject matter of the cause 
of action, and cannot, under any theory, relate to 
the claim of the plaintiffs, or to the defense of de-
fendant, and is not possibly calculated to lead to 
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Utah Rules 33 and 26(b) are duplicates of 
Rule 33 and Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
In discussing the limitations and boundaries 
of discovery, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 ( 1947) 
stated: 
"The various instruments of discovery now 
serve ( 1) as a device, along with the Pre-
Trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and 
clarify the basic issues between the parties, 
and ( 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, 
or information as to the existence or where-
abouts of facts, relative to those issues." ( 329 
U.S. 501) 
And as to the purpose of discovery, Barron & Holt-
zof f, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 641, 
P.10, state: 
"Discovery has three distinct purposes and 
uses: ( 1) To narrow the issues, in order that 
at the trial it may be necessary to produce 
evidence only as to a residue of matters which 
are found to be actually disputed and contro-
verted; ( 2) To obtain evidence for use at 
the trial; ( 3) To secure information as to 
the existence of evidence that may be used 
at the trial and to ascertain how and from 
whom it may be procured, as for instance, 
the existence, custody and location of per-
tinent documents of the names and addresses 
of persons having knowledge of relevant 
facts." 
Most of the Federal Courts that have had 
6 
occasion to consider the question here involved have 
held that the scope of the Federal Rules of Dis-
covery, even though subject to a liberal interpre-
tation, are not broad enough to permit inquiry 
into a defendant's liability insurance policy or its 
limits. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in an ex-
tensive opinion in which it reviewed all of the Fed-
eral cases involving this question, in the case of 
Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W. 2d 649 (1955), de-
nied the plaintiff's petition to require defendant 
to produce his policy of liability insurance for ex-
amination. The Court stated: 
"The rationale of the great bulk of federal 
cases dealing with the discovery rules is that 
the information sought by the discovery must 
either be admissible on a trial of the issues 
involved in the case or it must be such facts 
or information as will lead to the discovery 
of evidentiary information in some way re-
lated to the proof or defense of issues in-
volved in the trial of the case." (68 N.W.2d 
653) 
Since the Jeppesen decision, Supra, there have 
been two recent decisions from the Federal District 
Courts in Illinois - Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 
283 (E.D. Ill. 1958) and Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 
F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958). The Court in the Galli-
more case, in denying the use of Interrogatories 
to discover the limits of insurance, pointed out that 
the presence or absence of insurance by the defend-
ant has no bearing on the issue of liability in negli-
7 
gence actions, for the defendant's negligence "is 
the gravaman in such actions". 
In the Roembke case, the Court, in denying the 
use of Interrogatories, stated: 
"The purpose of discovery is for preparation 
for trial. A party, by use of the discovery 
rules, may obtain direct evidence for use in 
trial, or may obtain pertinent information 
that will lead to evidence for use in trial. The 
scope of discovery is broad, and so long as 
information sought by interrogatories or 
deposition can reasonably be said to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence it must 
be given ... 
"The existence or non-existence of liability 
insurance is not an evidentiary matter that 
may be used at the trial, nor is it relevant 
to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action." (22 F.R.D. 199) 
Disregarding those cases where the Courts 
have permitted a party to inquire into the exist-
ence of an insurance policy by reason of statutes 
permitting a '"direct action" against a wrongdoer's 
insurer (Louisiana and Wisconsin have such sta-
tutes) and those where the liability insurance was 
material and relevant to an issue raised such as a 
contested issue of operation and control or owner-
ship of an automobile (none of which are involved 
here), the great majority of State Courts have 
held that an inquiry by a party as to the opposing 
party's insurance coverage is not permissible. 
In Bean v. Best, 80 N.W.2d 565 ( S.D. 1957), the 
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Court denied a plaintiff Pre-Trial discovery of in-
surance coverage, reasoning that it was neither 
material nor relevant and was hence inadmissible 
as evidence. The Court declared that: 
"Plaintiff's suggestion that the policy may 
afford her rights of which she would not be 
able to avail herself unless she is permitted 
to inspect it, does not concern the pending 
lawsuit. Rather, it concerns a subsequent suit 
against the insurer - if she prevails in this 
one." (80 N.W.2d 567) 
The Florida Supreme Court, in Brooks v. 
Oioens, 97 So.2d 653 ( 1957), in denying plaintiff's 
right to discover the defendant's policy limits 
through Interrogatories, stated: 
"V\T e adopt the view that ... the limits of 
liability insurance on a policy covering an 
automobile of a defendant are not proper mat-
ters subject to discovery ... It is our view 
that the rule is applicable only to those mat-
ters admissible in evidence or calculated reas-
onably to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence." 
The California Court, in Superior Insurance 
Company v. Superior Court, 235 P.2d 833 (1951), 
in considering an Order for the perpetuation of 
testimony ruled that a witness could be compelled 
to testify with reference to an insurance policy. 
The Court in doing so construed Section 11580 of 
its Insurance Code - which gives a right of action 
by a judgment creditor directly against the debtor's 
insurance carrier -as making an insurance policy 
9 
"a contractual relation created by statute which 
would inure to the benefit of any and every per-
son who might be negligently injured by the assured 
... " ( 235 P.2d 835) 
There is no provision in our Utah Insurance 
Code similar to that relied on by the California 
Court. 
The Nevada Supreme Court, in State Ex Rel. 
Allen v. Second Judicial District Court, 245 P.2d 
999 (Nev. 1952), in rejecting the Superior case, 
Supra, stated that Nevada had no such statute as 
California and that the rule in Nevada was that as 
set forth in the dissenting opinion in the Superior 
case, wherein it was stated: 
"The conclusion that an injured person has a 
'discoverable interest' in the contract insur-
ing the liability of the tort feasor whenever 
an action is pending against the named in-
sured, misconceives the relationship of the 
parties. The demand of (applicant) to exam-
ine the policy by way of perpetuation of testi-
mony is based upon the assertion that she ex-
pects to sue Superior Insurance Company 
and its insured in the event that she obtains 
a Judgment against him. But such litigation 
will not be to 'recover' a loss under the policy; 
properly classified, it is an action to be re-
imbursed for damages suffered. * * * The 
primary purpose of allowing an injured per-
son to sue the insurer is to protect the judg-
ment creditor against the bankruptcy or in-
solvency of the debtor. * * * [Applicant] 
claims to be entitled to know the amount of 
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the maxim um liability of the insurer and 
the premiums paid on the policy. These facts 
are nut germane to any issue which may be 
presented in the action against the insured; 
obviously the sole purpose of the present pro-
ceeding is to obtain information which will 
aid in negotiating for a settlement. This is 
not within the legitimate purview of the sta-
tutes providing for the perpetuation of testi-
mony and the issuance of a subpoena duces 
tecum." ( 245 P.2d 1003) 
It is interesting to note that even though the 
California Courts have continued to follow the rule 
laid down in the Superior case, in the recent case 
of Laddon v. Superior Court, 334 P.2d 638 (1959), 
the Court recognizes that it is not in the majority 
and that its position is somewhat tenuous. The 
Court said: 
"While the decisions favoring discovery are 
persuasive in their reasoning, we might be in-
clined to follow the majority view if the ques-
tion were wholly new in California." ( 334 
P.2d 639) 
As in California, the Illinois State Supreme 
Court, in People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 145 N.E.2d 
588 (1957), looked to its statute on insurance giv-
ing a direct right of action against an insurer if 
a judgment is not satisfied. The Court concluded: 
"Thus, under our statutes, as in California, 
liability insurance is not merely a private 
matter for the sole knowledge of the carrier 
and the insured, but is also for the benefit 
of persons injured by the negligent operation 
of insured's motor vehicle." (145 N.E.2d 592) 
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The Colorado Supreme Court, in the case of 
Lucas v. District Court, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959), re-
quired defendant to furnish information to plain-
tiff pertaining to his liability insurance. The ma-
jority opinion, in addition to holding that under 
its Rule 26 (b), any matter relevant to an action 
could be inquired into regardless of whether or not 
it was calculated to lead to a discovery of admissible 
evidence, also looked to its Safety Responsibility 
Act to conclude that the matter of liability insurance 
was relevant. The Colorado act was cited as making 
the insurance carrier's liability absolute whenever 
loss or damage covered by the policy occurred . 
Under Utah's Safety Responsibility Act, Title 
41-12-19, through 23, U.C.A., 1953, the carrying 
of liability insurance is not mandatory and the pro-
visions of the Act cannot be applied to a liability 
insurer unless it has in fact voluntarily filed a cer-
tificate of insurance as proof of financial respon-
sibility on behalf of an individual insured. 
The wording of the dissenting Justices in the 
Lucas case, Supra, seem clearly applicable: 
"If the legislature so chooses it may declare 
the public policy of this state to require in-
surance coverage for all vehicles and drivers. 
It has not done so and this court has no power 
or right to invade the legislative field in this 
regard since that arm of government has al-
ready spoken. 
"The majority opinion proceeds on the false 
premise that the purpose of a driver or owner 
12 
in carrying public liability insurance is to 
protect the public. I venture to suggest that 
human nature being what it is, the true pur-
pose is to protect the insured f ram claims 
by injured parties which may be reduced to 
judgment. An examination of a modern li-
ability insurance contract will disclose that 
its purpose is to defend and indemnify. Pub-
lic liability insurance policies in Colorado are 
not issued 'pursuant' to our Safety Respon-
sibility Law and are not third party bene-
ficiary contracts before judgment under our 
statute. Authorities cited in this regard are 
not material to this matter." (345 P.2d 1072) 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in DiPietrun-
tonio v. Superior Court, 327 P.2d 746 (1958), hav-
ing under consideration Rule 26 (b), identical in 
wording to our Utah Rule, denied a plaintiff's right 
of inquiry by interrogatories into the defendant's 
liability policy. The Court, after reviewing all of 
the decisions touching on the question, concluded: 
'·'We believe that the decisions holding against 
discovery in cases like the instant case are 
better reasoned than those holding to the con-
trary. The California and Illinois cases cited 
by respondent are based in part upon their 
interpretation of statutes which, in our opi-
nion, in nowise justify the broadening of the 
language used in Rule 26(b), Supra." (327 
P.2d 751) 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in the recent case 
of Sanders v. Ayrhart, 404 P.2d 589 ( 1965), in 
sustaining the defendant's refusal to answer oral 
interrogatories concerning his insurance coverage, 
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adopted the language used in the case of J eppeson 
v. Swanson, 68 N.W. 2d 649 (Minn. 1955), in which 
the Court states: 
"It would seem to us that, even though the 
discovery is not to be limited to facts which 
may be admissible as evidence the ultimate 
goal is to ascertain facts or information which 
may be used for proof or defense of an action. 
Such information may be discovered by leads 
from other discoverable information. The pur-
pose of the discovery rules is to take the sur-
prise out of trials of cases, so that all rele-
vant facts and information pertaining to the 
action may be ascertained in advance of trial 
Where it is sought to discover information 
which can have no possible bearing on the 
determination of the action on its merits, it 
can hardly be within the rule. It is not inten-
ded to supply information for the personal 
use of a litigant that has no connection with 
the determination of the issues involved in 
the action on their merits. Balazs v. Ander-
son, D.C.N.D. Ohio, 77 F.Supp. 612. 68 N.W. 
2d at P. 656. 
"Under the guise of liberal construction, we 
should not emasculate the rules by permitting 
something which never was intended or is 
not within the declared objects for which they 
were adopted. Neither should expedience or 
the desire to dispose of lawsuits without trial, 
however desirable that may be from the stand-
point of relieving congested calendars, be per-
mitted to cause us to lose sight of the limi-
tations of the discovery rules or the boun-
daries beyond which we should not go. If, 
perchance we have the power under the enabl-
14 
ing act to extend the discovery rules to per-
mit discovery of information desired for the 
sole purpose of encouraging or assisting in 
negotiations for settlement of tort claims, it 
would be far better to amend the rules so as 
to state what may and what may not be done 
in that field than to stretch the present dis-
covery rules so as to accomplish something 
which the language of the rules does not per-
mit." ( 404 P.2d 592). 
The great majority of the State Courts have 
refused to require defendants to reveal the informa-
tion as to a defendant's liability insurance cover-
age.1 
Only two state courts have required the dis-
closure of the insurance without qualification, but 
several state courts have required the disclosure of 
the insurance coverage information for limited 
reasons, and where it appeared that the informa-
tion may lead to relevant facts or admissible evi-
1 Arizona, DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 327 P.2d 746 (1958); 
Connecticut, Verrastro v. Grecco, 149 A.2d 703 (1958); Delaware, 
Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514; Florida, Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 
693; Georgia, Patillo v. Thompson, 128 S.E.2d 656; Idaho, Sanders 
v. Ayrhart, 404 P.2d 589 (1965); Minnesota, Jeppesen v. Swanson, 
68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); Missouri, State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 
S.W.2d 631 (does allow name of company, but not terms of con-
tract); Montana, State ex rel. Hersman v. District Court of Sixth 
Judicial District, 381 P.2d 799 (1963); Nebraska, Mecke v. Bahr, 
129 N.W.2d 573 (1964); Nevada, State ex rel. Allen v. Second 
Judicial District Court, 245 P.2d 999 (1952); New Hampshire, 
Hardware Mutual Casualty Company v. Hopkins, 196 A.2d 66 
( 1963) (allowed inspection of policies but amounts of insurance 
coverage not required to be disclosed); New Jersey, Goheen v. 
Goheen, 154 A.393 (1931); Oklahoma, Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 
170 (1957); South Dakota, Bean v. Best, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957). 
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dence, or upon the basis of specific state statutes.2 
The majority of the Federal Courts whose de-
c1s10ns on this question have been reported, have 
ref used to require the disclosure of the insurance 
coverage.3 
Several Federal District Courts have required 
the disclosure of the information, with the District 
Court of the United States in California directing 
the information to be revealed because it did lead 
to a relevant issue of fact in the action.4 
2 Alaska, Miller v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (1964); California, 
Superior Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 235 P.2d 833 (1951) 
(based upon specific provisions of the California Code whereby 
insurance policies inure to the benefit of third persons negligently 
injured by an insured); Colorado, Lucas v. District Court of Pueblo 
County, 345 P.2d 1064 ( 1959) (Court holding that insurance policy 
was subject to State Financial Responsibility Law); Illinois, 
People, ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957); Kentucky, 
Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (1954); Michigan, Christie 
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 111 N.W.2d 30 (1961); 
Michigan, Layton v. Cregan & Mallory Co., 248 N.W. 539 (1933); 
(allowed because of the relevant fact as to car ownership); Mis· 
souri, State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (allowed name 
of insurance company only and for purpose of determining jurors 
connection with company); New York Martyn v. Braunn, 59 N.Y.S. 
- 2d 588 (1946) (based upon a relevant issue as to control of a 
stoop upon which plaintiff claimed to have fallen). 
3 Bisserier v. Manning (D. N.J. 1962) 207 F.Supp. 476; Cooper v. 
Stender (ED Tenn. 1962) 30 F.R.D. 389; DiBiase v. Rederi A!B 
Walship (ED N.Y. 1963) 32 F.R.D. 41; Flynn v. Williams (D. 
Conn. 1958) 30 F.R.D. 66; Gallimore v. Dye (ED Ill. 1958) 21 
F.R.D. 283; Hillman v. Penny (ED Tenn. 1962) 29 F.R.D. 159: 
Langlois v. Allen (D. Conn. 1962) 30 F.R.D. 67; McClure v. Boeger 
(ED Penn. 1952) 105 F.Supp. 612; McDaniel v. Mayle (ND Ohio 
1962) 30 F.R.D. 399; McNelley v. P.erry (DC Tenn. 1955) 18 
F.R.D. 360; Roembke v. Wisdom (SD Ill. 1958) 22 F.R.D. 197; 
Rosenberger v. Vallejo (WD Penn. 1962) 30 F.R.D. 352. 
4 Brackett v. Woodall Food Products (ED Tenn. 1951) 12 F.R.D. 4; 
Furumizo v. U.S. (D. Hawaii 1963) 33 F.R.D. 18; Hill v. Greer 
(D. N.J. 1961) 30 F.R.D. 64; Hooker v. Raytheon Co. (S.D. Cal. 
1962) 31 F.R.D. 120 (relevant to issue of ownership of vessel); 
Johanek v. Aberle (D. Mont. 1961) 27 F.R.D. 272; Novak v. Good 
Will Grange (D. Conn. 1961) 28 F.R.D. 394; Orgel v. McCurdy 
SD N.Y. 1948) 8 F.R.D. 585; Schwentner v. White (D. Mont. 1961) 
199 F. Supp. 710. 
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Rule 26 (b) states that discovery may relate 
to anything relevant to the subject matter involved 
in the pending action, but whether the defendant 
has or does not have liability insurance, is not rele-
vant to the subject matter. 
Liability insurance certainly does not relate to 
the claim or defense of the examining party, or the 
claim or defense of any other party, and it does not 
relate to books, documents, or the identity and loca-
tions of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. 
Rule 26 provides that the fact that the testimony 
sought would be inadmissible at trial does not make 
it objectionable; however, the Rule specifically 
states the testimony or evidence sought must ap-
pear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. 
The inquiry as to the existence of liability in-
surance, the name of the company, and the policy 
limits should be no more admissible in a personal 
injury action than inquiry as to the wealth, income, 
ownership of property, and other facts of the de-
fendant's financial status. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully represents that the great 
majority of the Courts have refused to require the 
disclosure of insurance policy limits and informa-
tion, and in this action, the disclosure of such in-
formation is not relevant to the subject matter of 
the personal injury action, and the information is 
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not reasonably calculated to lead to the di8covery 
of admissible evidence, and the information as to 
the name of defendant's insurance company and 
the limits of insurance has no possible bearing on 
the determination of the action on its merits. 
The Order of the District Court of Duchesne 
County should be reversed and the defendant and 
appellant not required to answer the Interrogatory 
of plaintiffs and respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR. 
By_ ---------------------------- -- -- ---------------------------
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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